I am a fourth-year Ph.D. student in economics at Northwestern University. I am interested in microeconomic theory, especially mechanism design, market design, social choice, welfare, distributive justice, ethics, and philosophy.
Before coming to Northwestern, I attended the University of Virginia where I received bachelor's degrees in economics and computer science.
Feel free to contact me at (erase the capitals): lorenREALfryxellHUMANS@ONLYu.northwestern.edu.
An Axiomatic Approach to Public Good Provision
Abstract: I consider a classic public good provision problem in a context where participation constraints need not be satisfied—for example, when a government has the power to tax its citizens. I replace such participation constraints with a weaker condition, which I call no-extortion, that limits the ability of the government to extract funds from its citizens. It is well known that there does not exist any strategy-proof, efficient, and budget-balanced mechanism. In fact, any strategy-proof, efficient, and individually-rational mechanism fails to raise any revenue in large populations when the good is provided. However, replacing individual-rationality with no-extortion yields a positive result: there exists a simple detail-free mechanism that is strategy-proof, efficient, extortion-free, and asymptotically budget-balanced. Furthermore, among all strategy-proof, efficient, and extortion-free mechanisms, this mechanism is undominated and uniquely minimizes any potential budget deficit.
I am not teaching this quarter.
In the past, I have TAed for principles of microeconomics, intermediate microeconomics, experimental economics, and environmental economics.
Here is a link to my CV: PDF